This article argues that current civilizational analysis as exemplified by the work of Shmuel N. Eisenstadt still shares the strengths and weaknesses of the original approach as developed by Marcel Mauss (and Émile Durkheim) a century ago. Eisenstadt's approach basically relies on a particular understanding of path dependency which immediately raises the question how civilizational patterns are reproduced after the crucial turning point of the Axial Age. This problem of civilizational persistence, however, remains largely unresolved and will not even be resolved in the future as long as civilizational analysis relies on mostly culturalist premises. Only a combination of arguments from the field of political sociology and the sociology of religion -as suggested by Johann P. Arnason -promises to explain how civilizations are able to reproduce their patterns over and over again.
polity' or 'world society' claiming to show a way out of the theoretical impasse into which macro-sociology had manoeuvred itself. Meyer's approach, however, is very closely related to similar ideas that had already been formulated by Talcott Parsons a long time ago (cf. Knöbl, 2007: 30-45) . It is no wonder, then, that Meyer's ideas and all these revised and supposedly new theories proved to promise much more than what could be fulfilled. Thus, most of the problems of the former macro-theories remained unsolved: often, the historical view is too linear (e.g. in modernization and neo-modernizationtheory), the conceptual apparatus is under-developed and thus tends to neglect the role of cultural forces (e.g. in revised forms of world systems theory), or there is no precise specification of the relationship between macro-and micro-processes (e.g. in theories of the 'world polity'/'world society').
Additionally, all these theories have been increasingly undermined by a newly observed empirical problem -the rise of religion that contradicts all the aforementioned theories insofar as their arguments are based on the theoretical expectation that the role of religion will diminish. This kind of argumentation follows the ideas of many of the founding fathers of sociology, namely that modernity is necessarily an era of secularization. However, since the end of the 1980s the idea that modernization and secularization are closely interrelated has been increasingly criticized within the frame of sociology of religion (Davie, 2007: 89-110) . Although there are still some very brave defenders of the idea that our world will be completely secularized (Bruce, 2002 ) the majority of sociologists of religion meanwhile tend to argue that the concept of secularization is one that at best fits the (West-) European experience, but which certainly cannot serve as a tool analysing Non-European contexts (McLeod, 2000; Davie, 2002; Casanova, 2006) . If this is true, then it is also obvious that religion had been and still is a force which must absolutely be taken into consideration in macro-sociological analysis, a force that definitely cannot be pushed to the margins of macro-sociological research since the effects of religious trends and movements will not be restricted to one particular and isolated religious sphere. They will also reach the 'wider world' and, last but not least, the sphere of politics. Careful observers could have already accepted this point in the past! It has been ignored, however, since the theoretical concept of secularization obviously was sacrosanct. It was only after the Iranian Revolution of the late 1970s that sociological arguments stressing the power of religious beliefs succeeded in convincing a more receptive audience within sociology (Casanova, 1994) . This was the context in which the rise of civilizational analysis occurred, the only viable macro-paradigm that could claim to take religion and all its 'effects' seriously into account.
But, as it turned out, civilizational approaches presented by scholars like Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Johann P. Arnason and others had their problems as well. Due to the fact that from its very beginning civilizational analysis was set up in a way that challenged many of the traditional sociological insights, practitioners in this field had to develop arguments which did not have much in common with the general sociological discourse. The need for a kind of 'against-the tidereasoning' -and at the same time all the problems connected with such a theor-etical strategy -can nowhere be seen better than in the writings of Marcel Mauss who at the beginning of the twentieth century ingeniously sketched out the contours of such a civilizational research programme. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that Mauss (and his occasional co-author, Émile Durkheim) quite clearly identified the chances but also the problems of this new mode of analysis. These problems were probably the reason why macro-theorizing based on a civilizational framework had been neglected for quite a long time until it was reinvented some decades later by Eisenstadt and others who used completely new ideas in trying to convince a reluctant sociological audience of the plausibility of this approach. Yet, the structure of Eisenstadt's overall theoretical argument -his emphasis on path-dependent processes within civilizations -has its own problems which are quite similar to those already faced by Mauss (and Durkheim) . Thus, Mauss's sensitivity to the problems of civilizational analysis can still tell us a lot about the methodological problems and theoretical tasks that this paradigm will have to solve in order to establish itself as an approach which is much superior to those macro-paradigms to which I had referred at the beginning of this Introduction. In the last main section of this article I will show that it is Eisenstadt's strong focus on cultural and especially religious factors that ironically leads to enormous 'anomalies' in his research programme; it should therefore be corrected and supplemented by political-sociological arguments. A short conclusion will sum up the main thesis of this article.
Marcel Mauss and the Beginnings of Civilizational Analysis: Prospects and Problems
Marcel Mauss was probably one of the first social scientists who headed towards a pluralization of the term 'civilization' and who used it in a value-neutral form. In contrast to former authors who tended to restrict this term to the highly developed regions of Europe and/or the West in general and who thus devalued all other parts of the world by refusing to use the term 'civilization' in such a context, Mauss began to talk of various civilizations (plural!) in very different worldregions without trying to bring all those civilizations into a hierarchical order. By refining and modifying ideas of his uncle Durkheim, Mauss used the term 'civilization' in a strictly theoretical way and defined it as follows: a civilization is a 'combination of phenomena that is sufficiently large, sufficiently numerous, and sufficiently important as much through their quantity as through their quality. A civilization is [a] combination of societies sufficiently vast in number that present these phenomena; in other words, a combination that is sufficiently large and distinctive that it can signify and bring to mind a family of societies. Moreover, this family derives one reason for its existence from certain facts: both current facts and those that are historical, linguistic, archaeological, and anthropological. These facts create the belief that these societies have been in prolonged contact and are related to each other. A collection of facts and of the expressions of these facts that corresponds to a combination Knöbl Path Dependency and Civilizational Analysis of societies, in a word, a sort of hypersocial system of social systems: now this is what we can call a civilization' (Mauss, [1930 (Mauss, [ ] 2004 Reading this quotation, one should not assume that Mauss's talk of a 'social system' implied that civilizations are closed or fixed entities. On the contrary, he emphasized that civilizations have to be defined culturally and lack the hyperstability of other social forms. What is important in any case, however, is the fact that the analysis of civilizations must not focus primarily on political entities and borders; much more important are linguistic and cultural-religious features that often cross and cut through the borders of those entities sociologists are used to calling 'societies' or 'nations' (Rundell, 2004: 208) . This does not mean, however, that borders are meaningless within civilizational analysis. As Mauss (and Durkheim) indicated, civilizations as 'families of societies' are themselves constituted by borders since within each civilization various processes of distancing from other civilizations are continuously going on. Thus, although the importance of national or societal borders within civilizational analysis tends to get diminished, the shifting and contested borders between whole civilizations should always be taken into consideration.
In any case, by defining civilizations via linguistic or cultural-religious categories, Mauss (and Durkheim) created the possibility of an empirical analysis of the various degrees of civilizational extension, penetration and integration. In this context, one should remember another of Mauss's remarks on civilizations, namely that each civilization has and had its centre and periphery (Mauss, [1930] 2004: 23). By arguing this way, Mauss immediately had to admit that the attempt to separate civilizations in a theoretically and empirically uncontested way might often be impossible. But these difficulties should not prevent social scientists from trying to further investigate the possible fruitfulness of a civilizational approach since the traditional narrow focus on the nation-state or the national society creates its own theoretical problems.
I have already stated that social scientists took quite a long time to act on Mauss's advice. But before reaching that point it is useful to highlight the theoretical moves that Mauss (and Durkheim) had suggested by introducing their new approach, moves that were often difficult to understand and to accept within mainstream social science research. (Arnason, 2003: 5) . 2. The use of the term 'civilization' not only implies that one has to ask oneself whether the term 'society' is the central macro-term of sociology, it also implies that one should distance oneself from the idea that there are closed and homogeneous entities, be they societies or civilizations. Mauss's talk of religious centres and peripheries immediately forces the analyst to do empirical research on the cohesiveness of those entities he or she is focusing on. There might be many overlaps between religious, economic, political, social and cultural networks and one should not suppose that these qualitatively different social networks have covered and always will cover the same territorial space. Again, the contours of civilizations have to be detected empirically, they must not be set by a priori decisions! 3. It is quite remarkable that Mauss (and Durkheim), although assuming the longevity of civilizations, are rather silent concerning the social mechanisms which guarantee this persistence. How are the features of a civilization reproduced not only over years, but over decades and even centuries? Of course, Mauss (and Durkheim) could have argued that religion and religious rituals are continuously re-enacting civilizations. But, as already indicated, these authors don't do it really. As far as this aspect is concerned, the most important point is not whether either religious or political or economic mechanisms are best suited in order to explain the continuous reproduction of civilizations. This, again, is an empirical problem! Far more important is the fact that practitioners of civilizational analysis are really willing and able to show that such mechanisms (whatever they are) are at work at all. The incredibly long persistence of civilizations is a problem difficult to explain and we have to wait and see whether and how it can be solved. 4. Mauss (and Durkheim) are also rather silent with regard to the question (related to the last problem) whether and how civilizations might change their patterns and structures in the course of (their) history. Do we have to understand the history of civilizations as a linear process in which an original religious, linguistic, and cultural core is continuously specified and developed? Or do the aforementioned processes of distancing from other civilizations, maybe even conflicts between civilizations, create moments of contingency altering the assumed linearity of civilizational processes?
Entering now the more recent debate on civilizational analysis, which is still being heavily influenced by the work of Shmuel Eisenstadt, we have to keep especially in mind the last two critical points and unresolved questions. But my aim in the following section is not to give an overview of Eisenstadt's work, of his brilliant elaboration of Karl Jaspers's idea of an 'Axial Age' and all the empirical insights that he has generated by taking Jaspers seriously (Knöbl, 2001) . For me, it is much more interesting to lay out the formal structure of Eisenstadt's theoretical arguments and to compare them to those of Mauss (and Durkheim) in order to see whether he has been able to overcome the theoretical problems which already haunted theorists of civilization at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Eisenstadt and the Argument of Path Dependency
It is well known that the main argument of Eisenstadt's civilizational approach is based on the thesis that the emergence of major religions in the time-period between 800 and 200 before Christ, i.e. in the so-called Axial Age, was a turning point in world history. According to Eisenstadt, all Axial Age religions -and this was their structural novelty -increased the tensions between the transcendent and the mundane world, thereby accelerating historical processes in a way unknown before. Since the gods were no longer interpreted as genuine parts of the mundane world, new (collective) actors began to emerge who -like religious intellectuals -had the difficult task of interpreting the (hidden) will of those gods and who were even able to criticize rulers and power-holders if their acts contradicted the particular will of god etc. However, and this is Eisenstadt's brilliant insight, the intellectual work being undertaken in order to reduce the tensions between the mundane and the transcendent spheres was not the same all over the world. On the contrary, solving these tensions could be achieved by rather different (intellectual) means which on their terms resulted in very different political and economic structures because of the fact that only in very few civilizations the idea of innerworldly redemption had gained such a dominance that it initiated an impulse to transform the world whereas in other civilizations a different ethic was preferred, an ethic which more or less shifted away from the strong involvement in worldly affairs. Since Eisenstadt claimed that civilizational structures resulted in particular forms of social change, that these structures can still be identified in our contemporary world, and that the civilization of modernity as invented in the West European and North American context is very much shaped by civilizational patterns, he obviously formulated a theoretical macro-paradigm that was able to take into account a phenomenon which for all other approaches was difficult or even impossible to deal with: the phenomenon of religion! In fact, Eisenstadt's theoretical framework not only accepted the criticisms directed towards theories of secularization, he actually made these insights the very centre of his theory. Thus, the concept of 'civilization' seemed to be the solution to many problems which 'traditional' macro-paradigms tried to overcome in vain. However, one should not forget that Eisenstadt's central theoretical argument was also formulated in a quite typical way raising some questions concerning the relationship between contingency, on the one hand, and path dependent developments or trajectories, on the other. To put it differently: a critical discussion European Journal of Social Theory 13(1) of Eisenstadt's theoretical framework can be fruitfully situated within the debate on path dependency that has been and still is an extremely hot topic within the social sciences since the 1980s at least. Eisenstadt, who developed his ideas much earlier, was certainly not influenced by this academic discussion. Nevertheless, situating Eisenstadt's ideas within it promises to be a good starting point in order to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of his theoretical framework and to ask whether the problems and critical points that could already be found in the civilizational writings of Mauss (and Durkheim) have been overcome by Eisenstadt's more recent approach.
The debate on path dependency, one should remember, began within the discipline of economic history since it was there that a theoretically counterintuitive phenomenon emerged, the longevity and persistence of economically sub-optimal arrangements in a particular market, i. e. arrangements that rather surprisingly are not wiped out by processes of market competition (David, 1985) . Such a strange persistence is caused by the fact that originally invented, but certainly not perfect technical solutions for a product idea often result in consequences and effects which are stabilizing these sub-optimal solutions. Under certain circumstances, for example, it becomes too difficult and too costly to get rid of the original solution since in the meantime rules, institutions, habits etc. have been developed around the original arrangement that in themselves are costly to change. In this case, it seems more rational to stick to the original, even incomplete solution since otherwise the costs of any change would simply be too high. The famous example for such an awkward situation is usually the 'Qwerty' keyboard in the English-speaking world. Following the original development millions of secretaries were trained on this keyboard. This and many other things are the reasons why it is nearly impossible to change the basic structure of the keyboard, although we know today that a different configuration of the letters would actually increase the speed of the typewriting process. Thus, an economically suboptimal solution survived within the market since 'increasing returns' have stabilized a supposedly outdated product design in the past and will also stabilize it in the future:
[I]ncreasing returns can cause the economy gradually to lock itself into an outcome not necessarily superior to alternatives, not easily altered, and not entirely predictable in advance. Under increasing returns, competition between economic objects -in this case technologies -takes on an evolutionary character, with a 'founder effect' mechanism akin to that in genetics. 'History' becomes important. To the degree that the technological development of the economy depends upon small events beneath the resolution of an observer's model, it may become impossible to predict market shares with any degree of certainty. This suggests that there may be theoretical limits, as well as practical ones, to the predictability of the economic future. (Arthur, 1989: 128) Are these statements by Brian Arthur and Paul David only valid in the economic sphere? Such a question was immediately raised by other social scientists and the answer was quite clear. It is obvious that phenomena of path dependency can be observed in other social fields as well so that, at first sight, it doesn't do any harm if Eisenstadt, deliberately or not, has used exactly such a path-dependent argument in developing and refining his own theoretical ideas. For it is the very essence of Eisenstadt's argument that the 'invention' of transcendence in the Axial Age was the decisive event which has been the starting point of historical developments leading to very different civilizational trajectories in different regions of the world. The Axial Age was the critical juncture that triggered various civilizational processes. Eisenstadt is thus indeed using an argument of path dependency, the structure of which, according to Ronald Aminzade, consists of three elements: an argument of path dependency, first, must analyze the forces impinging on key choices that were decisive determinants of future opportunities. Second, they identify subsequent key choice points in a sequence. These forks in the road, or bifurcation points, are marked by the presence of alternative possible paths that were not taken . . . Finally, the argument pinpoints mechanisms that sustain movement along the chosen path and prevent reversal or subsequent shifts to alternative possible branchings. (Aminzade, 1992: 463) Reviewing Eisenstadt's work, one can argue that in his empirical and theoretical writings he succeeded in elaborating the first two elements of path-dependent arguments described by Aminzade. Eisenstadt is usually rather convincing when he describes the political and intellectual constellations during the Axial Age in various regions of the world, and when he points out how these new ideas concerning the transcendence of the gods have been, again, in a variety of ways, institutionalized step by step in peculiar civilizational arrangements. But it is also obvious that up to this point Eisenstadt couldn't really manage to clarify the third element highlighted by Aminzade. For in his works, the mechanisms which could explain the long persistence of civilizations, i.e. the durability of institutional complexes that often survive dozens of centuries, are not clear at all. How can we explain that religious constellations having emerged during the Axial Age are still able to influence us even today? This seems to be a decisive point for civilizational analysis (as could already be seen by our discussion of Mauss's and Durkheim's ideas). Only if Eisenstadt and other civilizational analysts are able to convincingly demonstrate the existence of such mechanisms, can they legitimately claim to have developed an approach that is much better suited than other macro-paradigms to describe and even explain the longue durée of historical processes. Thus, Eisenstadt and his colleagues still have to solve the problem that Kathleen Thelen, with regard to the 'conventional' debate on path dependency, has stated as follows: 'it is not at all obvious . . . how institutions created at some critical juncture in the sometimes quite distant past actually make it to the present, given the magnitude of some of the intervening events and developments' (Thelen, 2003a: 101; emphasis in the original). Facts and events that explain the emergence of institutions (here, civilizations) are not necessarily best suited to explaining the way how institutions (again, civilizations) reproduce themselves in the long run (Thelen, 2003b: 214) . A reconstruction of the founding moments of civilizations, i.e. of the events and processes that were going on during the Axial Age, might not tell us a lot about the conditions under which civilizations
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are reproduced much later. It is probably not a very unkind or unjustified move to argue that up to this point Eisenstadt didn't offer convincing solutions to this particular problem, i.e. of the third element in Aminzade's logic of pathdependent arguments (cf. however, the remarks in Wagner, 2005 , where some hints are given on how to solve this problem).
If one accepts the above description, concerning the deficit within Eisenstadt's theory, i.e. if one accepts that his writings don't tell us very much about the mechanisms that reproduce institutional complexes of civilizations over time, one has also to admit that the problems that were already troublesome in the writings of Mauss (and Durkheim) are still with us today. Even more, if the core of Eisenstadt's approach is an argument about path dependency, then one has to be aware that the problem of the persistence of civilizations is indeed particularly serious. Whereas economists, political scientists and sociologists usually have the task of explaining institutional trajectories within modern societies (e.g. the persistence of certain types of welfare regimes or of varieties of capitalism) and thus only have to identify mechanisms that usually do not last longer than some decades, Eisenstadt and civilizational analysts in general have to demonstrate the working of such mechanisms that might survive for more than a millennium. Can they do it in a convincing way? This is an important question, and if it is not possible to solve the problem all statements concerning the impact of certain civilizational patterns on our contemporary world probably will lose a lot of their plausibility. To put it differently: only if the recurrent mechanisms with which civilizational patterns reproduce themselves are identified does the talk of multiple modernities (plural!) make sense. Otherwise the arguments of those scholars expecting the emergence of one single modernity might, at least on the surface, be more convincing. And there is one more point. Only if we understand these particular mechanisms are we able to say at least something about the stability of civilizational trajectories and thus are able to answer the question that already Mauss (and Durkheim) could have been asked: How linear are civilizational paths and what is the role of contingency within such civilizational trajectories? This is the reason why I will try to find out in the following section if there are any possible solutions and answers to these questions and problems, and what they might look like.
The Problem of Civilizational Persistence: The Need for Theoretical Re-Orientation
For me, there are two principal ways of explaining the persistence of civilizations: on the one hand, a strategic move that stays within the field of cultural sociology, but that creates, as will be seen, its own problems; on the other hand, an alternative, which is in my view the more promising move, since it closely connects political-sociological arguments and those of the sociology of religion.
Let's first have a look at a possible attempt to explain civilizational persistence by introducing arguments developed within cultural sociology. It would certainly be plausible to complete Eisenstadt's original arguments by those that have been developed around the concept of 'cultural memory'. Such a theoretical move would not clash with Eisenstadt's overall project, since in various parts of his writings he creatively draws on similar ideas. But is this really the most convincing strategy to explain civilizational persistence? Let's take a look at Jan Assmann's work; he has probably done more than anybody else to refine the concept of 'cultural memory'. Assmann has argued that the widely used term of 'tradition' is in itself insufficient to explain the reproduction of cultures (and, one might add, civilizations). Using many of the ideas developed by Maurice Halbwachs some decades earlier, Assmann (2000: 124ff.) describes how the media of cultural memory changed with the emergence of societies that have developed the ability to produce written records: whereas in oral cultures, communal rituals are the decisive mechanisms guaranteeing the persistence of customs and traditions, processes look quite differently when written documentation was invented in a particular society since this was the moment rendering possible a new way of storing knowledge and traditions.
Drawing on these insights, one could certainly argue that macro-sociologists do have a chance to solve the problem of civilizational persistence by focusing much more strongly than before on the phenomenon of cultural memory. Indeed, there is certainly some truth in such a statement. However, attention should also be drawn to Assmann's further insights, namely that the possibility of written documentation does not guarantee a kind of fixation of tradition and thus the unquestioned validity of customs and norms. As Assmann has made sufficiently clear, the typical process of storing information by means of written records also opens the possibility that original meanings may (slightly) change, that earlier records often tend to lose their plausibility as time goes by, etc. Although almost all Axial Age civilizations have tried to canonize their sacred texts in order to prevent such a shift of meaning, the 'problem' of cultural change was and still is not removed, since texts always invite certain individuals and intellectuals to interpret and re-interpret those sacred documents. Thus, ideological and religious dissidence is always around. And this means that using Assmann's insights in order to remedy deficiencies in Eisenstadt's path-dependent argument could turn out to be a very ambivalent strategy. At least one should not forget Assmann's claim that cultural memory is an amorphous entity, containing as much seemingly uncontested ancient truths as subversive and even heretical elements (Assmann, 2000: 41) . If these considerations are true, it doesn't really help to use the concept of 'cultural memory' in order to explain path-dependent developments and thus civilizational persistence.
All these arguments suggest an alternative theoretical move to which I have already referred: the attempt to connect insights from political sociology to those of a sociology of religion. If under pre-modern conditions religious and political processes have always been closely interconnected, and if it is true that a market situation in which different (religious) world views freely competed with each other never really existed, then it makes sense to emphasize, much more than Eisenstadt actually did and does, the importance of particular political factors in processes of civilizational reproduction. To put it differently: Eisenstadt's overemphasis on cultural-religious mechanisms that supposedly 'program' long-term processes of social change is not a very convincing strategy. It doesn't seem to be very plausible to argue that individual and collective actors in different regions of a civilization and in very different periods of time were again and again reproducing the same civilizational arrangements by just drawing on the same intellectual and cultural resources because of the simple fact that under pre-modern conditions a common tradition that was shared by all individuals within a civilization did not always exist. Communication and transport were just too difficult in order to achieve some kind of a normative integration of societies or even civilizations (Abercrombie et al., 1980) .
Here one can also draw on some insights from institutionalist reasoning as well. As Lynn G. Zucker (1977) emphasized quite a long time ago, the maintenance of cultural patterns was often extremely dependent on the mechanisms of social control. Especially in contexts in which norms and values are not very well institutionalized, it is rather difficult to guarantee the transmission of these very values and norms from generation to generation. Assuming that civilizational patterns -especially those which supposedly cover huge geographical territories -are such slightly institutionalized structures, then the reproduction of these structures is anything but guaranteed. On the contrary, intergenerational transmission will only take place if there are authoritative resources in the background which 'force' individual and collective actors to accept the values in question. Using the language of civilizational analysis this could be stated more explicitly as follows: explaining the long durability and persistence of civilizational patterns requires an analysis of those mechanisms of power, authority, and control that guarantee the transmission of these very patterns. Or to put it differently: 'traditional' civilizational approaches have to be pushed much more into a politicalsociological direction; Eisenstadt, who has certainly not failed to point out political constellations at the beginnings of civilizations, must re-orientate his writings in a more power-sensitive direction when analyzing especially those long phases of the history of civilizations in which cultural reproduction is on the agenda. This is exactly one of the goals of Johann P. Arnason's theoretical approach within civilizational analysis, since he is one of those scholars who most convincingly argue that civilizational patterns have to be supported by political power in order to be stabilized over time. With good reason, Arnason claims that civilizations often have been connected to imperial projects, i.e. connected to a particular form of political power. Emphasizing this aspect of civilizational reality not only helps to solve the problem of persistence of civilizational patterns because it thereby becomes understandable why power-holders are interested in preserving and expanding institutional arrangements, it also helps to reintroduce the role of contingent events into civilizational thinking. Since, as has been shown, the structure of Eisenstadt's theoretical undertaking is based on the idea of path dependency, it is not very surprising to see that he often relies on very deterministic assumptions when describing the trajectories of civilizations after the Axial Age. After the triggering event of the invention of transcendence the reader of Eisenstadt's work often gets the idea that the cultural tracks of a particular civilization are laid down once and forever so that the outcomes of civilizational processes are somewhat predetermined. Such a problematic impression is supported by Eisenstadt's own talk of 'cultural programs' that supposedly shape civilizations (Eisenstadt, 2000: 15ff. ). Arnason's emphasis on imperial projects, in contrast, prevents such misunderstandings since his focus on imperial power almost by definition highlights the role of intercivilizational encounters that often cause rather surprising effects. As Arnason puts it: one has to assume that there are 'profoundly ambiguous interrelations between civilizations, imperial formations (always associated with some cultural and ideological visions of unity) and religious universalisms' (Arnason, 2003: 303) whose interplay certainly will lead to results that are ignored by an almost exclusive focus on supposedly isolated civilizations.
It is certainly not too far off the mark to characterize Arnason's project as an attempt to 'bring political power back' into civilizational analysis. Drawing both on insights of the sociology of religion and of political sociology he has a much better chance of explaining civilizational persistence. Such a more politically oriented research strategy would at least be able to solve two of the problems which civilizational analysts usually run into when focusing too exclusively on religious-cultural phenomena: (1) culturalist interpretations of civilizations have often inherited the specific weaknesses of classical modernization theory insofar as both are not really able to identify the decisive actors that are responsible for processes of social change. It might be odd to accuse Eisenstadt of having neglected the role of religious and political elites, since 'elites' are the central actors that Eisenstadt really analyzes. At the same time, however, it doesn't seem unfair to claim that his strong focus on elites in the Axial Age and at the historical beginnings of particular civilizations increasingly becomes weaker, the closer he is to our own period. The more Eisenstadt analyzes modern times, the more difficult it becomes to identify in his writings the decisive actors responsible of processes of social change and to understand the reasons why they still continued to stick to the particular heritage of 'their' civilization. Arnason's emphasis on political power, his emphasis on empires and states and their carriers, in contrast, makes it much easier to identify the mechanisms responsible for the continuous reproduction of civilizational patterns. It simply helps to understand the fact that often (certainly not, always) the political elites were capable of stabilizing civilizational structures in the past and that even nowadays they are still able to formulate cultural counter-projects to Western modernity in many parts of the world. (2) Culturalist interpretations usually favour a synchronic analysis of civilizations and thus often have difficulties describing and, above all, explaining historical change within civilizations. The dynamic character of civilizations sometimes simply gets lost by using such an approach. Again, a stronger focus on political power, in contrast, might help to explain why particular features of civilizations remain stable over time while others might change rather rapidly. A stronger focus on imperial projects might also help understand why some cultural patterns spread over vast geographical territories while others remain restricted to a particular area. And, last but not least, a stronger focus on politics might also give us some insights concerning the fact that only some civilizations really expand geographically whereas others stay within the territory they originally have 'conquered' (suggestions concerning this stronger focus on intercivilizational encounters can be found in Nelson, 1973) .
To pay more attention to political-sociological questions does not mean abandoning the many fruitful insights coming out of the sociology of religion. Up to this point my argument has not been that there is a kind of trade-off between political-sociological reasoning, on the one hand, and religious-sociological reasoning, on the other. Quite the contrary is true! I would rather argue that even some of Eisenstadt's religious-sociological arguments are still underdeveloped and could be further strengthened to make his approach more convincing. Thus, one could argue that Eisenstadt's whole approach is closely related to a typical constellation of problems that dominated theology and the founding phase of German sociology at the beginning of the twentieth century. At that time, and especially in this particular national context the intellectual question of the connection between religion, on the one side, and subjectivity or individual redemption, on the other, was at centre-stage (cf. the brilliant remarks in Kippenberg, 2001) . Such an interest is certainly not alien to Eisenstadt's theoretical project as well since many of his remarks on the Axial Age point out the problem of (individual) redemption. To be sure, there is certainly nothing wrong with this interest. One has to be aware, however, that such a focus almost automatically reinforces a phenomenological approach to the study of religion since the personal relationship between god(s) and the individual seems to play a most important role. Often downplayed within this approach is the fact that religion is more than a matter of individual redemption. Religion is also related to communal experience and belonging, a point which was, of course, quite strongly emphasized by Émile Durkheim and Max Weber in some of their classical writings. One could argue, therefore, that Eisenstadt's focus on the Axial Age, his attempt to understand the intellectual solutions that try to reduce the tensions between the transcendent and the mundane world, is in danger of underestimating the communal aspects of the rise of world religions. Emphasizing this communal aspect, so the argument goes, would almost automatically bring political power back in because then the following question is on the agenda: Why did some religions have the potential to function as community cults (cf. Casanova, 2003: 26) and thus succeed in interweaving religious and political structures of civilizations in an enormously tight way, while others did not? Thus, such a theoretical move would be much more convincing than exclusively culturalist arguments, when it comes to explaining the (long) persistence of civilizations.
Conclusion
Summing up, it was my argument that civilizational analysis has to be pushed much stronger into a political-sociological direction than has been done in the Knöbl Path Dependency and Civilizational Analysis past. This, indeed, is the case right now since some of the original arguments on the concept of the Axial Age have been modified by Eisenstadt and some of his colleagues (Eisenstadt, 2005) . It has become increasingly clear that the historical path from the discovery of transcendence to the formation of world religions was not a direct one, but one that was very much influenced by political constellations. And, in addition, world religions were sometimes the cultural milieus out of which projects of imperial power began to develop. New forms of political power emerged which made it easier to understand how civilizational patterns could stabilize over such long time periods. In particular, Björn Wittrock (2005: 63f.) has pointed out that the complex of the 'Axial Age' not only led to cultural transformations of the utmost importance but also to changes of political macroinstitutions which in themselves decisively shaped the contours of particular civilizations. Such a theoretical move towards a more carefully developed politicalsociological reasoning within civilizational analysis not only helps us to draw a better picture of the historical beginnings of civilizations, but -and this was my argument -also allows us to understand the long persistence of civilizational traits and thus justifies the claim that indeed multiple modernities will be with us in the foreseeable future.
